An experimental analysis of grandfathering vs dynamic auctioning in the EU ETS by Botelho, Anabela et al.
  
 
 
Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada 
Universidade do Minho 
 
An experimental analysis of 
grandfathering vs dynamic 
auctioning in the EU ETS 
 
 Anabela Botelho 
Eduarda Fernandes 
Lígia Pinto 
 
 
October 2010 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
No. 39/2010 
  
An experimental analysis of grandfathering vs dynamic auctioning in the EU ETS 
by 
Anabela Botelho, Eduarda Fernandes, Lígia Costa Pinto* 
October 2010 
 
Abstract 
This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% 
auction versus a 100% free allocation of CO2 permits under the rules and parameters 
that mimic the EU ETS (imperfect competition, uncertainty in emissions’ control, and 
allowing banking). It also incorporates a first attempt to include in the analysis 
measures of the risk preferences of subjects participating in emission permits 
experiments. Another distinctive feature of this study is the implementation of a 
theoretically appropriate auction format for the primary allocation of emission permits. 
Our experimental results indicate that the EU ETS has the potential to reduce CO2 
emissions, achieving targets considerably more restrictive than the current ones at high 
efficiency levels, both with auctioned and free emission permits. Auctioning, however, 
reveals a clear potential to do better than grandfathering the initial allocation of permits. 
In addition, the results reveal that concerns about undue scarcity, and corresponding 
high prices, in secondary markets generated by a primary auction market are not 
warranted under the proposed dynamic auction format. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of auctions as a rule for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits in the 
next stages of the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) is a subject 
that the European Commission and its Member-States are currently discussing and 
evaluating. This paper is the first to experimentally test the Ausubel (2004) auction for 
the case of CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS. 
The European Union has stepped forward in its commitment for GHG 
(greenhouse gases) emissions’ reduction by defining on its Climate Policy the goal to 
reduce GHG at least 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. The EU ETS is therefore 
a major policy initiative to achieve CO2 emissions’ reductions. This political choice to 
fight a global negative externality is on the same line as the Kyoto Protocol flexible 
mechanisms, which included an international market for GHG transaction, as well as 
the more recent RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, for ten states of the US.1 
Emission permit markets have been used for local pollutants like SO2 (sulphur 
dioxide) since the 80s and 90s, mainly in the US and Canada, but its application for a 
global pollutant, like CO2, has an innovative character. It is for this reason, and because 
the EU ETS dimension and complexity is considerably different from previous markets 
(due to its multi-jurisdictional political structure, connection between differing domestic 
emissions permits programs, etc.), that we focus on this specific application of emission 
permits markets (EPM). 
Several studies exist about the EU ETS and a consensual point is usually 
highlighted: the importance of the institutional rules adopted for its performance, as for 
any other EPM. Particularly, the initial allocation rule decided under the 2003/87/EC 
Directive (grandfathering) recurrently appears as one of the least positive aspects of the 
institution chosen to implement the EU ETS. In fact, auctioning instead of 
grandfathering is presently recommended inside the EU for the third phase of the 
market (starting 2013), as we can find in the COM(2008) 16 final from 23.1.2008, pp.7: 
“Auctioning best ensures efficiency of the ETS, transparency and simplicity 
of the system and avoids undesirable distributional effects. Auctioning also 
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 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
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best complies with the polluter-pays principle and rewards early action to 
reduce emissions. For these reasons auctioning should be the basic 
principle for allocation.” 
 
Neuhoff and Matthes (2008) summarize the main reasons why auctioning should 
be adopted for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS as follows: 
i) it eliminates uncertainties about future changes in the allocation schemes, favoring 
investment decisions and innovation from firms included in the 2003/87/EC Directive; 
ii) it allows governments to receive the necessary revenue to encourage innovation, to 
reduce taxes, or to compensate the poorest families from increases in energy prices as a 
consequence of the environmental policies; iii) it is a simple and fair scheme to allocate 
emission permits, which guarantees a higher public support. In fact, as we read in the 
Commission Recommendation above, instead of the Coasian “right to pollute” it is the 
Pigouvian “polluter-pays” principle that is applied with auctioning, which might bring a 
higher consensus around the more restrictive environmental policies the EU is about to 
impose in the next years. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the use of auctions as a 
rule for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits in the next stages of the EU ETS. 
Under Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972) original models for EPM, the initial 
allocation rule does not affect the efficiency of the policy instrument (it matters only on 
equity terms). Our investigation examines whether this is the case for the EU ETS. We 
therefore experimentally investigate the performance of an EPM similar to the EU ETS 
under alternative allocation rules: grandfathering and auctioning. 
The experimental methodology has been widely used in studies examining 
emission permit markets in the US and Canada with purposes similar to ours: works by 
Godby et al. (1997), Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999), Franciosi et al. (1999), Cason 
et al. (1999), Mestelman et al. (1999) and Gangadharan et al. (2005) are just a few. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case for the EU ETS. To our knowledge, this is the first 
experimental study to include both the rules and the parameters that parallels the EU 
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ETS structure.2 Our experimental market is characterized by imperfect competition (few 
agents with different dimensions, different marginal abatement costs and different 
environmental targets) under a cap-and-trade system, with banking allowed, a secondary 
market represented by a double auction with discriminative prices and a penalty 
structure for noncompliance similar to the 2003/87/EC Directive. 
Another novel feature of our experimental design is the implementation of the 
Ausubel (2004) auction as the rule for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits. 
Although several types of auctions have already been experimentally tested for the 
initial allocation of emission permits, the present study is the first to implement a 
dynamic auction for the multi-unit demands that characterize this market, and that, 
theoretically, yields the same results as the Vickrey auction, its static counterpart. 
In addition, we included the elicitation of subjects’ risk preferences in our 
experimental design. This is, therefore, the first study on EPM that explicitly classifies 
participants in the experiment with respect to their attitudes towards risk, allowing us to 
test the hypothesis raised in the literature concerning the relationship between subjects’ 
banking behavior and their attitudes towards risk. 
Below we develop our experimental design, and subsequently we discuss the 
structural features (parameters) implemented in our experiments. Then we detail 
experimental procedures, and in section 5 present our working hypotheses. Results are 
reported in section 6, and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design 
Our experimental variable is the rule for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits 
in the EU ETS. Hence, two experimental treatments were conducted differing only with 
respect to the initial allocation rule: grandfathering vs. auctioning. 
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 For example, Benz and Ehrhart (2007) experimental study on the initial allocation of CO2 allowances in 
the EU ETS is far from implementing its institutional features and therefore does not constitute a testbed 
for this market. 
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All our experimental sessions were computerized (using the zTree software from 
Fischbacher (2007)) and had three parts: 1) A standard socio-demographic 
questionnaire; 2) The implementation of a Multiple Price List (MPL) for the elicitation 
of subjects’ risk attitudes; and, 3) An Emission Permits Market (EPM). The first two 
parts were included for control purposes, and the last and central part of the 
experimental sessions implements the market for CO2 emission permits under the 
features of the EU ETS. Each of these parts was initiated only when all participants 
finished all the tasks in the previous part. 
 
A. Elicitation of risk attitudes 
Elicitation of subjects’ risk attitudes was carried out using the instrument developed by 
Holt and Laury (2002). This instrument, a Multiple Price List (MPL), entails presenting 
subjects a set of ordered binary lotteries to choose all together. In our implementation of 
the MPL design, subjects were required to make a series of 10 choices between two 
payment options (or lotteries), A or B. Each of these payment options comprised a high 
prize and a low prize. The high prize for payment option A was €2.00 and the low prize 
€1.60; the high and low prizes for payment option B were €3.85 and €0.10, respectively. 
Each subject received the high or the low prize of the chosen payment option according 
to the number of a ball randomly extracted from a bag containing 10 balls individually 
numbered from 1 to 10. 
Figure 1 shows the MPL presented to subjects in each of our experimental 
sessions (translated from Portuguese). The first row in this table reveals that the 
probability of getting the high prize in each of the payment options is 1/10 so that only 
extremely risk loving subjects are expected to pick payment option B in the first 
decision. The probabilities associated with the high prize in each option increase by 10 
percentage points as subjects proceed down the table, and the last row pays the high 
prize in each option for sure. The expected values associated with each decision and 
payment option indicate that a risk-neutral subject is expected to choose option A in the 
first four decisions, and switch to option B thereafter. Only highly risk averse subjects 
are expected to choose option A in the second last row, but even those are expected to 
switch to option B in the last decision. 
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Following Holt and Laury (2002), subjects were free to choose between these 
two payment options but in our experiments we imposed the consistency restriction that 
after choosing option B at any one decision row subjects were not allowed to switch 
back to option A, thereby avoiding the erratic choices problem and consequent 
difficulties associated with its analysis. Subjects were also informed that earnings from 
this part of the experiment were to be determined at the end of the session using the 
following procedure: each subject extracts one ball from the bag with 10 balls to 
determine which of the 10 decisions is to be used for payout for that subject, and 
another random draw determines whether the subject receives the high or low prize 
according to the chosen payment option in that decision. This random lottery incentive 
procedure is commonly applied with the MPL instrument, and its properties are 
thoroughly discussed by Harrison and Rutström (2008). 
The data collected from this part of the experiment allow us to classify subjects 
as risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving in order to verify whether their banking 
behavior in the third part of the experiment can be explained in terms of subjects’ risk 
attitudes. 
 
 
Figure 1 – zTree screen for the MPL used 
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B. Market Institution 
A sequence of 10 market periods constituted the third part of every experimental 
session. The implemented market institution resembles as close as possible the rules 
predicted on the 2003/87/EC Directive for the EU ETS. To examine the effects of the 
rule for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS, two treatments 
were implemented: one treatment with grandfathering as in the 2003/87/EC Directive, 
and another treatment with auctioning of all the available emission permits, following 
the recommendations in COM(2008) 16 final from 23.1.2008. All language in the 
experimental instructions was context-free. Emission permits, environmental goals or 
policy instruments for regulation were never mentioned. Subjects were told they were 
placed in a market where each firm (subject) must surrender a certain number of units of 
an abstract good in each period. Each unit had a certain cost known only to the subject, 
and earnings could be realized through trading in the market under pre-specified rules. 
In the grandfathering treatment, participants knew how many units they would 
be given in the session (emission permits): a fixed amount, equal in every period. In the 
example shown in Figure 2, the subject must a priori surrender 6 (activity) units in 
every period, each at the indicated cost in experimental points, and the units given are 
marked with a “Yes” (ie, the subject does not bear the costs of the units that are given), 
amounting four given units in each period for a total of 40 given units in the session. 
The subjects’ first decision in each period was either to use all the allocated permits for 
the period or to save some of them for the future, ie, a banking decision. This feature of 
the design means that, concerning the intertemporal validity of emission permits, we 
allowed banking but not borrowing, as established in the 2003/87/EC Directive: non-
used permits are still valuable for the following periods but market participants are not 
allowed to use in the current period emission permits they know will be given to them 
in the next periods.3 Subjects entered their decisions in the spaces provided under 
“Planned Use”. Thus, if the subject in the first period decided to save one permit for use 
in the second period, he would enter a “3” in the provided space for the first period and 
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 Borrowing is not explicitly allowed in the EU ETS. However, because of the gap between the delivery 
date of emission permits from one year (30th April of the following year) and the allocation of emission 
permits for the next one, firms might in fact borrow emission permits. 
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a “5” in the provided space for the second period. Subjects were free to use all the 
allocated permits in the current period or to save some or all of them for use in future 
periods as long as the planned use in each period did not exceed the total number of 
units the subject must surrender in each period, and the planned use over the 10 periods 
is equal to the total number of allocated permits in the session (restrictions and 
appropriate error messages were programmed in the zTree software to ensure 
compliance with these rules). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – zTree screen for banking decision 
 
Once all subjects were done with their banking decision, a new zTree screen 
opened the market for emission permits transactions. For this (secondary) market, a 
double auction with discriminative prices was implemented. Figure 3 illustrates the 
zTree screen for one subject during this stage. The number of units the subject must 
surrender in the period, their respective costs, and the number of permits he is using in 
the current period (according to the banking decision in the previous stage) is shown in 
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the table at the left hand side of the screen. Subjects make profits by buying non-given 
units at a price lower than their cost, and by selling given units at a price higher than 
their cost. 
Subjects submit bids in the space provided under “Buying Price”, and offers in 
the space provided under “Selling Price”. They were free to change their bids and offers 
at any time under the constraints that only improving bids and offers were allowed. In 
addition to obey the improvement rule while making their bids/asks, only profitable 
transactions were allowed in this market. Moreover, no re-sale was possible in the 
market (once bought, emission permits had to be used to avoid abatement costs). 
Standing bids were shown in the box under “Buy at a price of” and any seller could 
accept a standing bid at any time by clicking the button “Sell”. Standing offers were 
shown in the box under “Sell at a price of” and any buyer could accept a standing offer 
at any time by clicking the button “Buy”. Once a unit was bought or sold, it appeared 
appropriately marked as such under the column “Given” and the associated profits 
under the column “Profits”. 
Subjects knew only their own marginal abatement costs and maximum permits 
needed, but each transaction made in the market was publicly known (although the 
seller/buyer identification was not available) as shown in the box under “Transaction 
Prices”. This market closed when time limit was reached (3 minutes) or all participants 
pressed the “OK to next stage” button on the zTree screen. After that, subjects were 
prompted to an “uncertainty resolution” screen as illustrated in Figure 4. 
9 
 
 
Figure 3 – zTree screen for the initial market 
 
Uncertainty in the control of emissions was introduced in the experiment 
following the procedure devised by Godby et al. (1997), ie, a random variation on 
emissions was drawn from a uniform distribution over the values (-1, 0, +1) where a “-
1” means the subject had to surrender one more unit than initially predicted, a “+1” 
means the subject supported the cost of one more unit than necessary, and a “0” means 
that the number of units the subject had to surrender was exactly the initially predicted 
number. 
To ensure comparability of results, we used the same distribution for the 
different experimental sessions. Subjects with a unit deficit or surplus were reminded of 
the possible courses of action and their consequences in each and every period, as 
Figure 4 illustrates. Subjects with a unit surplus could save it for future use, or could try 
to sell it in a reconciliation market. Subjects with a unit deficit could use any previously 
saved unit (in the banking phase) to clear it at this moment, or could try to buy one more 
unit in the reconciliation market. In case the subject did not opt for any of these options, 
he would have to pay a fine for noncompliance about four times the emission permits 
equilibrium price, and, in addition, surrender one more emission permit in the next 
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market period. These rules for noncompliance mimic those included in article 16º of the 
2003/87/EC Directive. 
 
 
Figure 4 – zTree screen for uncertainty resolution 
 
 
This screen was opened for 40 seconds each period to avoid subjects just 
bypassing the information. At the end of this time, the screen for the reconciliation 
market opened for subjects with unit deficit or surplus. Figure 5 illustrates the screen for 
this market. The rules for this market were similar to the initial market. However, less 
time was given for the transactions to be concluded (1.5 minutes), only the deficit/ 
surplus unit could be traded, and non-profitable transactions were allowed. 
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Figure 5 – zTree screen for the reconciliation market 
 
The auctioning treatment was equal to the grandfathering treatment in every 
respect except that instead of being given for free, emission permits had to be bought in 
an initial auction where all subjects participated as buyers. Given that auctioning as a 
rule for initial allocation of permits is not yet a reality for the EU ETS, we first had to 
decide which auction format to implement. Sealed-bid uniform price auctions are well 
known by utilities regulated in the EU ETS, have been used in Ireland, Hungary and 
Lithuania in the first phase of the EU ETS, and Holt et al. (2007) recommend it to 
auction CO2 under the RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. However, the 
literature has shown that this auction format results in allocative inefficiency (Ausubel 
and Cramton (1998) or Holt (2006), for example) in multi-unit contexts as the one 
considered here. The second-price sealed bid auction format – the Vickrey auction - is 
theoretically recognized as the most efficient for multiple-unit auctions. Despite its 
superiority, this auction format is not usually implemented in practice due to its 
complexity, and the consequent cognitive difficulties it entails. We therefore decided to 
implement the ascending-bid auction proposed by Ausubel (2004), a dynamic 
counterpart to the Vickrey auction that theoretically yields the same results but has the 
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advantages of maintaining the privacy of bidders’ valuations, and is much simpler for 
them to understand. 
Although a number of experimental studies have already examined the 
performance properties of the Ausubel (2004) dynamic auction (eg. Kagel and Levin 
(2001), Engelmann and Grimm (2004), and Manelli et al. (2006)), this is, to our 
knowledge, the first experimental study implementing this auction for the initial 
allocation of CO2 emission permits within a market characterized by uncertainty, 
banking, a secondary market and a reconciliation market. 
Figure 6 illustrates the zTree screen subjects saw in the auction for the initial 
allocation of permits. Following the rules proposed by Ausubel (2004), the auctioneer 
calls a price, and each subject responds with quantities. In the example below, the 
auctioneer is calling a price of 99 experimental points, and the subject is informed of 
how many units are profitable at that price, and reminded that earnings in this auction 
equal the difference between the cost of each unit and the price paid for its acquisition. 
The subject is then free to respond any number of units, as long as it does not exceed a 
maximum number of units determined for each subject according to a budget constraint 
(for each subject, this is the number of activity units times the equilibrium market price 
divided by the auctioneer’s initial calling price). This process iterates with increasing 
prices called by the auctioneer until demand is equal or less than total supply, and the 
auction closes at this point. 
It is important to note that the subject’s payment is not equal to the quantity 
bought in the auction times the closing price. In fact, for each bidder and at each called 
price, the auctioneer determines whether total demand by the other bidders is less than 
total supply. If that is the case, then the difference is considered “clinched”, and the 
newly clinched units are sold to the bidder at the called price; the price paid is therefore 
the opportunity cost of awarding the unit to the winning bidder. A private value, 
incomplete information version of the Ausubel (2004) auction was implemented. This 
means subjects knew only their own marginal abatement costs and while the auction 
was open, they did not know anything about others demand nor the result from their 
own proposals at each price. As long as the price in the auction increased, subjects 
could conclude only that the demand for permits was still higher than supply. When the 
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auction closed, each subject was informed of how many units he was awarded and their 
respective prices. At this point, the auctioning treatment proceed in the same manner as 
the grandfathering treatment, with “Given” units now designated “Acquired” units, 
corresponding to those bought by the subject in this auction. 
 
 
Figure 6 – zTree screen for the Ausubel auction 
 
 
A summary of all the sequential phases or stages that constituted each market 
period in the third part of the experimental sessions is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Summary of the different stages from the 3rd part of the experimental design 
Stage 0:  Initial Auction for acquisition of emission permits 
Possibility of making bids (quantities) at each price proposed by the auctioneer. This stage does not 
exist in the grandfathering treatment. 
Stage 1:  Banking decision 
Subjects decide whether or not to use all the permits in the current period– i.e., decide to bank or 
not all or some of their permits for future use. 
Stage 2: Permit market 
Possibility of buying from or selling permits to other subjects. Emission permits for the current 
period, not banked on the previous stage, can be sold at a price higher than the marginal abatement 
cost, and permits may be bought to cover units to abate, at a cost inferior to its marginal abatement 
cost. 
Stage 3: Information about random shock 
At this stage no decision has to be made. 
Participants are informed about non-predicted fluctuations on their emissions. It is announced the  
(-1, 0 ou +1) random fluctuation for the period and its impact on subjects’ earnings. Information  
is given about available possibilities to reduce the negative impacts on earnings (or even make 
further profits).  
Stage 4: Reconciliation market 
Only participants with a “ +1” or “-1” at the previous stage can participate in this market to buy/sell 
the unit correspondent to the random fluctuation. 
No restrictions are imposed on transaction prices, meaning that transactions at a loss are possible on 
this market. 
Stage 5: Re-banking decision 
Participants with a surplus permit, not sold at the reconciliation market, are given a chance, on this 
stage, to save it for future use. 
Participants with permit deficit that were not able to buy it at the previous stage are given a chance 
to use an emission permit previously banked. Obviously, this stage only opens if participants had 
previously banked at least one permit.  
 
 
3. Experimental parameters 
Two considerations guided the determination of the total, and individual, environmental 
target implemented in the laboratory. First, and following the EU ETS, we implemented 
a cap-and-trade system in our experimental design. However, we included a more 
restrictive environmental target than that established in the second phase of the EU ETS 
in order to avoid the lack of liquidity on the market under that target. In addition, the 
number of emission permits each participant in the experiment received under the 
grandfathering treatment was proportional to the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA), 
which consisted on dividing the burden of the EU commitment under the Kyoto 
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Protocol unequally amongst member states (due to their different economic realities 
concerning the composition of energy production, the relative importance of energy 
intensive industries on each countries' exports, etc.). 
Parameters must also be chosen carefully to ensure the highest possible 
parallelism of our laboratorial EPM to the EU ETS structure. Thus, for the abatement 
cost structure of each participant, we considered the estimated coefficients of the 
marginal abatement cost functions of 14 countries of the EU-15 as reported by 
Eyckmans et al. (2000). Out of these, we selected eight of the highest polluter countries: 
Belgium, Spain, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, U.K. and Netherlands.4 Hence, each of 
our sessions had 8 participants, and each participant represented each of these countries. 
As such, the chosen dimension for each subject was proportional to the countries’ 
projected total emissions of CO2 in 2010, with the highest value of 827.5 million tons of 
CO2 for Germany and the lowest value of 109.4 million tons of CO2 for Greece. We 
made the latter correspond to 5 units in our experimental design, and applying a direct 
proportional rule to every other country, Germany’s dimension was 38 units.5 Table 2 
presents the number of units, and the corresponding abatement costs (experimental 
points) attributed to each subject in our sessions. Mimicking the structure of the chosen 
EU-15 member-states, we have an imperfect competitive structure, with few 
participants having heterogeneous dimensions, marginal abatement costs and emission 
targets. 
As noted above, uncertainty in the control of emissions was introduced in the 
experiment following the procedure devised by Godby et al. (1997). In our specific 
application, the sum of the 80 randomly generated values was -10; thus, in each entire 
session, total emission abatement was 10 units less than the expected imposed limit, and 
10 less permits were available over the entire session (a table in the appendix presents 
the uncertainty matrix implemented in each session).  
 
                                                           
4
 We selected only 8 countries due to budget constraints, and also to ensure the best control during the 
experimental sessions given the length and complexity of the experiment. 
5
 For programming reasons, and to ease the cognitive burden on the subject representing Germany, we cut 
by 10 units the number of units attributed to this subject. This simplification does not interfere with 
market equilibrium, and therefore has no effect on the results. 
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Table 2 – Marginal abatement costs 
Units  Belgium (S1)  
Spain 
(S2)  
Germany 
(S3)  
Greece 
(S4)  
France 
(S5)  
Italy 
(S6)  
U.K. 
(S7)  
Netherlands 
 (S8) 
1  76  37  4  59  21  17  6  32 
2  177  90  11  149  56  42  15  76 
3  291  152  18  255  100  72  25  127 
4  413  220  27  374  151  105  37  182 
5  543  294  36  503  208  140  50  241 
6  678  372  46    270  177  63  304 
7    454  56    337  216  77  369 
8    539  67    408  257  92  436 
9    627  79    483  300  107  506 
10    719  91    561  344  123   
11    813  103    643  389  140   
12    909  115    729  436  157   
13    1008  128    817  484  174   
14      142    908  533  192   
15      155    1002  583  210   
16      169    1099  634  228   
17      184    1199  686  247   
18      198    1301  739  266   
19      213      792  286   
20      228      847  306   
21      243     
  
 326 
  
22      259     
  
 346 
  
23      274     
  
 367 
  
24      290     
  
 388 
  
25      307        409   
26      323        431   
27      340           
28      356           
Note: Units covered by grandfathered emission permits are signaled in bold – correspond to avoided abatement costs 
before banking or going to the market. It sums 88 units, and corresponds to (fixed) supply of permits in each period. 
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Finally, the supply of emission permits in the auctioning treatment was 88 units 
in each period, corresponding to the total number of emission permits given under the 
grandfathering treatment. The auctioneer initial calling price was set at 99 experimental 
points (below the equilibrium benchmarks), increasing in 20 points each round, and the 
final non-biding price (corresponding to the ultimate round after which the auction ends 
exogenously) was set at 1319 points, ie, strictly above the highest marginal valuation 
amongst all bidders. 
 
4. Experimental procedures 
We report the results of seven experimental sessions that were conducted at the 
Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Minho, Portugal (this is a 
computerized laboratory with personal cubicle style working stations to ensure subjects’ 
privacy). Four of these sessions implemented the grandfathering treatment in November 
2008, and the other three sessions implemented the auctioning treatment in May 2009.6 
Fifty six subjects took part in these experiments: eight different individuals participated 
in each of those sessions (inexperienced subjects), the majority being Management (full 
time) students with an average age of 21 years. Students were recruited in classes, 
where a €5 participation fee was announced. Depending upon the treatment we were 
recruiting for, a 2h30m and a 3h00m (for the grandfathering and auctioning treatment, 
respectively) expected duration of the session was also announced at the recruitment 
moment. Average expected earnings, also made public at the recruitment moment, were 
about €20, comfortably in excess of their likely opportunity cost for the time involved 
(considering the minimum hourly wage was about €3 in Portugal in 2009). 
Our experimental sessions lasted about the time we predicted, and subjects 
earned on average €15.83 and €22.17 in the grandfathering and auctioning treatments, 
respectively. Subjects were paid individually, and privately, at the end of each session. 
                                                           
6
 Two pilot sessions were also conducted in March 2008 for the grandfathering treatment, and in March 
2009 for the auctioning treatment. Participants were very heterogeneous on these sessions: undergraduate 
students from different scientific areas, PhD students from Minho University, professionals from different 
sectors, with and without a college degree. The objective was to test whether the instructions were clear, 
and to ensure the code had no bugs. These pilot sessions originated some modifications to original 
instructions, and played a crucial role on the subsequent success of our sessions. 
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In each session, only when all eight subjects arrived were they allowed to enter 
the lab and were free to sit in any of the signaled places/stations. Thus, subjects were 
given a different role in the market randomly, and upon arrival they signed an informed 
consent form. As noted before, all the instructions were written using a neutral language 
and therefore subjects did not know they were playing the role of countries in the 
experiment. 
Subjects were informed upfront that there would be three parts in the session, 
and only after completing the first two parts were they prompted to the instructions for 
the third part of the experiment. After going through the instructions for the third part of 
the experiment, subjects participated in a three period training market using the 
experimental software. During these periods, all participants saw the same screens while 
the experimenters were reading the instructions for these periods and going through pre-
programmed examples common to all subjects (the parameter values used were 
different from the ones used in the real periods, ie, the 10 periods that counted for 
subjects’ earnings). After that, subjects were prompted to two more training periods, 
without the experimenters’ guidance and clarifications, where they interacted with each 
other in the market under the rules of the market and facing the parameter values 
implemented in the real periods. 
Due to the random fluctuation on emission abatement, subjects in the experiment 
could experience negative earnings. In order to prevent such losses, subjects were given 
an initial endowment in experimental points. As in Cronshaw and Kruse (1999), and 
because of the existent great gap between subjects’ potential earnings (according to the 
role played), we set different initial endowments for the different subjects to balance 
these earnings. In the grandfathering treatment, experimental points earned during the 
third part of the experiment were converted to euro at the publicly announced 
conversion rate 100 points=1 Euro. To balance subjects’ potential earnings in the 
auctioning treatment, a different conversion rate was given to each participant as in 
Godby (1996) or Carlén (2003), for example. 
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5. Hypotheses 
Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical results, we formulate five hypotheses 
against which the observed laboratory behavior can be judged. Benchmark values for 
equilibrium prices, quantities and abatement costs were computed assuming a 
maximizing behavior from participants in our laboratory market. Given the 
implemented uncertainty in the control of emissions, however, subjects’ optimizing 
behavior depends upon their risk preferences. Following Godby et al. (1997), we expect 
risk neutral and risk averse profit maximizers to save (bank) one unit over the course of 
the session as a precaution against the possibility of a bad draw in the uncertainty 
resolution stage. Since the worst possible outcome in each period is to own one less unit 
than expected, banking exactly one unit provides risk averse subjects with complete 
insurance.7 Risk loving subjects, on the contrary, are expected to use all the permits they 
have on the current period to maximize their earnings. Thus, we state the following first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Risk neutral and risk averse subjects bank one permit during the course 
of the session; Risk loving subjects do not bank permits. 
 
Secondly, we ask whether an imperfectly competitive market similar to the one 
operating under the EU ETS converges to the competitive equilibrium so that the 
environmental target established by the regulator is achieved at the lowest possible 
cost.8 We therefore state our second hypothesis as follows: 
                                                           
7
 Although the expected value of the uncertainty distribution is 0 (no unit deficit nor surplus), risk neutral 
subjects are also expected to bank one permit because expected earnings from no banking at all are 
negative due to the substantial penalty costs associated with a unit deficit. 
8
 Notice that we cannot exclude market power issues given the implemented parameter set. Two of the 
subjects, S3 and S7 (representing Germany and UK, respectively), control about 45% of the permits and 
both have similar and relatively low abatement costs. Although no communication is allowed between the 
subjects, and all bids, offers, transactions, etc, are anonymous (a factor that hinders tacit conduct), their 
repeated interaction and the similitude of their cost structures (quite low compared to all others) facilitates 
the development of tacit coordination (eg. the identification of a “focal” point in terms of prices) between 
these two subjects. The profits from such a “collusive” path are potentially quite large (ie, the profit loss 
for a deviating subject is significant) to sustain tacit conduct: for example, and considering the extremes, 
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Hypothesis 2: Total abatement cost minimization is possible in the market under the 
EU ETS having grandfathering as the initial allocation rule. 
 
We also ask whether the environmental target established by the regulator would 
be achieved at the lowest possible cost in the EU ETS market if the initial allocation of 
permits proceeded through a 100% auctioning rather than grandfathering, giving rise to 
our third hypothesis:9 
 
Hypothesis 3: Total abatement cost minimization is possible in the market under the 
EU ETS having a 100% auctioning as the initial allocation rule. 
 
In addition, we test whether these different initial allocation rules have no effect 
on the resulting level of abatement cost, and state our fourth hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Total abatement cost within our EPM is equal in the grandfathering and 
auctioning treatments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
if these two subjects coordinated at the monopoly price, equilibrium price predictions for the 
grandfathering treatment under a system benchmark would, all else the same, range from 140 up to 216 
points (and quantities from as low as 3 units up to 7 units) considering all trading periods, whereas the 
competitive counterpart yields equilibrium prices ranging in the interval 128-152 points (and quantities in 
the interval 5-10 units). In this study, we are interested in testing experimentally whether the implemented 
institutional features prevents subjects from exercising market power, allowing the emergence of the 
competitive outcome even in the presence of high market concentration and the potential for tacit conduct 
that characterize the market operating under the EU ETS. 
9
 Theoretically, under the features of the implemented auction format (namely “privacy preservation” and 
the independence of players’ payments from their own bids), subjects have no incentives to misrepresent 
their true values for the units. It is, however, an open empirical question whether these features do impair 
any subjects’ attempts/ability to manipulate prices (creating or maintaining market power) under the 
conditions of the implemented market.  
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In analyzing the results of our experiments, two different benchmarks need to be 
considered depending upon subjects’ risk attitudes and banking behavior. Adopting 
Godby’s terminology, we computed a Market Equilibrium Benchmark assuming 
subjects bank one permit during the session, and a System Equilibrium Benchmark 
assuming subjects use all the available permits in each period. In either case, 
equilibrium transaction prices in the secondary market are expected to be higher, and 
equilibrium quantities lower, in the auctioning treatment than in the grandfathering 
treatment.10 In fact, under conditions of certainty in emissions’ control, we would 
expect no transactions whatsoever to occur in the secondary market in the auctioning 
treatment given an efficient allocation of permits during the initial Ausubel auction. 
However, due to the uncertainty in emissions’ control implemented in our treatments, 
along with the banking possibility, some transactions are necessary in the secondary 
market to guarantee the minimization of abatement costs even if the Ausubel initial 
auction allocates permits efficiently. Because the uncertainty matrix and the rules of the 
reconciliation market are the same in both treatments, we have no reasons to expect 
differences in transaction prices and traded volumes between the treatments in this 
market. These considerations give rise to our fifth hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Transaction prices in the secondary market are higher, and traded 
volumes lower, in the auctioning treatment than in the grandfathering treatment. 
Transaction prices and traded volumes in the reconciliation market are the same in 
both treatments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
10
 Note that the lowest profitable selling prices (and the highest profitable buying prices) in the secondary 
market are lower (higher) in the grandfathering treatment than in the auctioning treatment following an 
efficient allocation of permits during the initial Ausubel auction. Considering only the first period, for 
example, the lowest profitable selling prices belong to subjects S3 (79) and S7 (92) in the grandfathering 
treatment (Table 2); from the predicted allocations in the Ausubel auction (table in the appendix), the 
lowest profitable selling prices belong to subjects S6 and S7 (140). 
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6. Results 
A. Risk attitudes and banking behavior 
Following Holt and Laury (2002), we classified subjects’ risk preferences according to 
the number of safe choices they made in the MPL. Out of the 56 subjects that 
participated in our sessions, only 5.36% of them made fewer than 4 safe choices, and 
were accordingly classified as risk lovers; another 5.36% made exactly 4 safe choices 
and were classified as risk neutral, and the reminder 89.29% were classified as risk 
averse (although the proportion of risk-averse subjects was marginally lower in the 
grandfathering treatment than in the auctioning treatment, the difference is far from 
achieving statistical significance). These results are consistent with Harrison and 
Rutström (2008)’s finding, in their extensive review of experimental evidence on risk 
preferences that, in general, subjects behave as if they are risk averse in laboratory 
experiments. 
Looking at subjects’ banking behavior, we found that 8.93% of them did not 
bank any permits during the course of the whole session, and that only 1.79% of the 
subjects banked an average of 1 permit, as predicted for risk-neutral/risk-averse 
subjects. The percentage of subjects that banked a positive amount, but lower than 1 on 
average is 78.57%, and the percentage of subjects that banked more than 1 permit on 
average is 10.71%. Again, no statistically significant difference was found in subjects’ 
banking behavior between the treatments. Using Holt and Laury (2002)’s classification, 
however, we find no association between subjects’ risk preferences and their banking 
behavior. For example, all the subjects that did not bank any permits during the whole 
session are classified as risk averse. In addition, the fraction of banking decisions in 
which zero permits are banked does not vary with subjects’ risk preferences, as shown 
in Table 3. This table collates the raw frequency for banking levels (0, 1, and greater 
than 1), pooling over treatments and periods, and we do not reject the null hypothesis of 
no association between risk preferences and banking level using a Pearson χ2 test (p-
value=0.837). 
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Table 3 – Raw tabulation of banking results 
Frequency  Column percentages No. banked permits 
Risk neutral 
and Risk 
Averse 
Risk 
Loving 
 Risk neutral 
and Risk 
Averse 
Risk 
Loving 
Total 
  0 266 15  55.77 55.56 55.75 
  1 160 10  33.54 37.04 33.73 
>1 51 2  10.69 7.41 10.52 
Total 477 27  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Pooling over treatments, the total number of banking decisions is 504 = 56subjects×9decision 
periods. 
 
On average, risk-loving subjects banked 0.52 permits each period. Risk-neutral 
and risk-averse subjects, on the other hand, banked an average of 0.63 permits per 
period. This difference is not statistically significant, which is not surprising given the 
few number of subjects classified as risk loving. One-sample binomial tests also reject 
the null hypothesis that the fraction of banking decisions in which risk-loving (risk 
neutral/averse) subjects bank zero permits approaches 1 (0). In any case, these results do 
not corroborate our hypothesis 1 as stated. 
We summarize these findings in the following result. 
Result 1: Risk neutral/risk averse subjects bank less permits, and risk loving subjects 
bank more permits than theoretical predictions. 
 To complement the analysis of subjects’ banking behavior, we use conditional 
statistical procedures that make use of the panel structure of our data, while accounting 
for the “spike” at zero banked permits in the data as shown in Table 3. In particular, we 
estimate a hurdle model (or two-part Poisson model) to capture the idea that the process 
by which subjects decide to bank zero permits is different from the process by which 
subjects decide to bank some positive number of permits. Subjects in our experiments 
have to decide whether to bank any permits at all, and only then does the process 
determining the positive number of banked permits apply. Thus, banking zero permits is 
the “hurdle” that must be passed before reaching positive counts. 
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The overall likelihood function for the hurdle model is the product of two 
likelihoods, where the first likelihood corresponds to the probability that a subject banks 
a positive number of permits, and the second likelihood corresponds to the probability 
model for the distribution of nonzero counts only (Mullahy (1986)). Specifying the 
appropriate probability distributions for each part of the model allows us to obtain 
consistent and efficient estimates of the parameter vectors by separately maximizing 
each likelihood (McDowell (2003)). The dependent variable in the first part of the 
model is dichotomous in nature (either an individual banks permits or not), and a probit 
specification is used to estimate the parameters of this part. The dependent variable in 
the second part of the model consists of nonzero counts, and a zero-truncated Poisson 
specification is used to estimate the parameters of the second part. Due to the panel 
nature of our data, we use a “clustering” specification that controls for intra-subject 
correlation. 
Independent variables include subjects’ risk preferences, session effects, 
performance measures of previous period markets, and the emissions’ fluctuation in the 
previous period. Subjects’ risk preferences are measured using a dummy variable taking 
the unit value if the subject is classified as risk neutral or risk averse based on the 
number of safe MPL choices (RNA). The effect of the uncertainty matrix implemented 
in the experiment is measured using the draw the subject faced in the previous round of 
the uncertainty resolution stage (Drawt-1), and the performance of previous period 
markets is measured using the root mean squared deviation of transacted from 
equilibrium prices in the secondary market (αSMmktt-1) and in the reconciliation market 
(αRMmktt-1).11 Finally, dummy variables for the sequence of periods within the 
treatments are also included to capture any adjustment patterns over time while 
remaining agnostic about appropriate learning models. 
Table 4 provides maximum likelihood estimates of the hurdle model for these 
data. The top panel in the Table reports the estimates of the marginal effects of each 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable of the binomial probability model, and 
the panel at the bottom reports the estimates of the marginal effects of each explanatory 
                                                           
11
 These variables are further explained in the subsections below. We report the results using convergence 
measures to Market price benchmarks, but all the econometric results are robust with respect to the use of 
the alternative System price benchmarks. 
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variable on the dependent variable of the truncated Poisson model. The focus variable is 
the RNA binary dummy since it measures the marginal effect of subjects’ risk 
preferences on banking behavior. It clearly has a statistically significant effect on the 
number of banked permits conditional on making any, and no effect at all on the 
decision to bank some permits or none. The latter result supports the non-parametric 
findings: risk loving and risk neutral/averse subjects choose to bank zero permits at 
similar rates (marginally higher for risk neutral/averse subjects, but far from achieving 
statistical significance). The two groups of subjects, however, differ on the amount of 
banked permits, conditional on there being any, as evidenced by the significant and 
positive marginal effect of RNA in the truncated Poisson equation. This is evidence that 
subjects’ risk preferences influence their banking behavior, and that the direction of the 
change in behavior is consistent with risk aversion being more conducive to higher 
levels of banked permits when someone does bank some permits. 
One could hypothesize that an unexpected unit deficit in the previous uncertainty 
resolution round would impact positively the propensity to bank permits in the current 
period, but the results show no effect of the uncertainty draw on either the propensity to 
bank some permits or on the conditional amounts banked. Similarly, there is no clear 
adjustment pattern over time in either case, and behavior in the auctioning sessions does 
not differ from that observed in the omitted grandfathering session. Although previous 
measures of performance in trading markets have no effect on the current propensity to 
bank some permits, they do show an impact on the conditional amount of banked 
permits. The results suggest that slower contract price convergence in the main permit 
market (our secondary market - αSMmktt-1) positively impacts the amount of banked 
permits conditional on some banking. Albeit at a much smaller rate (almost negligible), 
and just on the boundary of statistical significance, slower contract price convergence in 
the reconciliation market (αRMmktt-1) also has a positive impact on conditional banking 
behavior. To a degree, these results provide empirical support to the argument that 
market participants base their current banking decisions on previous market permit 
prices (eg. Newell et al. (2005)). 
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Table 4 – Maximum likelihood estimates of the hurdle model of banking decisions 
Variable Description Estimate SE p-value 95% C.I 
Binomial Probit 
RNA Risk Neutral/Averse -0.11 0.17 0.51 -0.45 0.22 
Drawt-1 Uncertainty draw 0.02 0.03 0.61 -0.05 0.08 
αSMmktt-1 Price convergence SM -9×10-4 2×10-3 0.63 -5×10-3 3×10-3 
αRMmktt-1 Price convergence RM -3×10-5 3×10-4 0.91 -6×10-4 6×10-4 
SessionG2 Grandfathering – Session2 -0.19 0.14 0.19 -0.47 0.09 
SessionG3 Grandfathering – Session3 -0.06 0.17 0.71 -0.40 0.27 
SessionG4 Grandfathering – Session4 -0.04 0.17 0.80 -0.37 0.28 
SessionA1 Auctioning – Session1 -0.12 0.16 0.46 -0.44 0.20 
SessionA2 Auctioning – Session2 0.07 0.18 0.68 -0.27 0.42 
SessionA3 Auctioning – Session3 -0.10 0.16 0.53 -0.41 0.21 
Period3 Period 3 -0.03 0.13 0.82 -0.27 0.22 
Period4 Period 4 0.43 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.60 
Period5 Period 5 -0.06 0.11 0.55 -0.27 0.14 
Period6 Period 6 -0.13 0.10 0.22 -0.33 0.08 
Period7 Period 7 -0.18 0.09 0.04 -0.36 -0.01 
Period8 Period 8 0.05 0.09 0.55 -0.12 0.22 
Period9 Period 9 -0.09 0.10 0.33 -0.28 0.10 
Zero-truncated Poisson 
RNA Risk Neutral/Averse 0.33 0.17 0.05 2×10-3 0.66 
Drawt-1 Uncertainty draw -0.03 0.08 0.70 -0.18 0.12 
αSMmktt-1 Price convergence SM 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
αRMmktt-1 Price convergence RM 1×10-3 8×10-4 0.09 1×10-4 2×10-3 
SessionG2 Grandfathering – Session2 -0.32 0.17 0.06 -0.66 0.02 
SessionG3 Grandfathering – Session3 -0.41 0.19 0.03 -0.79 -0.03 
SessionG4 Grandfathering – Session4 0.57 0.68 0.41 -0.77 1.91 
SessionA1 Auctioning – Session1 0.63 0.68 0.35 -0.70 1.96 
SessionA2 Auctioning – Session2 1.62 1.50 0.28 -1.32 4.56 
SessionA3 Auctioning – Session3 0.24 0.48 0.63 -0.71 1.18 
Period3 Period 3 0.65 0.72 0.37 -0.77 2.07 
Period4 Period 4 0.78 0.52 0.13 -0.23 1.79 
Period5 Period 5 0.51 0.46 0.27 -0.39 1.41 
Period6 Period 6 0.94 1.10 0.39 -1.22 3.09 
Period7 Period 7 0.27 0.38 0.47 -0.48 1.02 
Period8 Period 8 -0.19 0.25 0.44 -0.69 0.30 
Period9 Period 9 0.27 0.46 0.56 -0.62 1.16 
Notes: Because the variables Drawt-1, αSMmktt-1,and αRMmktt-1 have no antecedent for period 1, we lose 
all first period observations. Thus, adjustment over time is normalized on period 2. Log-pseudolikelihood 
value for the binomial Probit (truncated Poisson) is -209.55 (-106.08); Wald test for the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are zero in the binomial Probit (truncated Poisson) has a χ2 value of 68.28 (58.28) 
with 17 df, implying a p-value less than 0.001. 
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B. Market Performance 
Figure 7 summarizes the main results (also shown in Table 5) from our sessions with 
respect to abatement costs. The horizontal lines show mean abatement costs pooled over 
the 10 trading periods for the auctioning treatment (A_Observed), and the 
grandfathering treatment (G_Observed). Also represented with horizontal lines are the 
mean minimum abatement costs pooled over the 10 periods for the computed 
benchmarks (System and Market). For both treatments, the overall observed means are 
closer to the Market benchmark than to the System benchmark. This result is to be 
expected given subjects’ banking behaviour. Although subjects’ banking behaviour did 
not conform to either of the System or Market specifications in none of the treatments, 
their behavior was on average closer to the latter. 
It is clear from the Figure that, on average, observed behaviour in both 
treatments follows closely the theoretical optimum. As the Figure suggests, per period 
mean abatement costs in the grandfathering treatment are not statistically different from 
either the System or the Market optimums (based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney 
test applied to per period means, for conventional significance levels). Thus, our second 
result is: 
 
Result 2: Total abatement cost minimization is possible in the market under the EU 
ETS, having grandfathering as the initial allocation rule. 
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Figure 7 – Abatement Costs 
 
The same finding applies if we consider behaviour under the auctioning 
treatment compared to both benchmark values, and our third result is: 
Result 3: Total abatement cost minimization is possible in the market under the EU 
ETS, having a 100% dynamic auction as the initial allocation rule. 
 
Table 5 – Abatement cost benchmarks and observed values 
 Abatement Cost Benchmarks  Observed Abatement Cost 
 BTU  CCU  Grandfathering  Auctioning 
Period System Market  System Market     
1 2663 3892  3236 4937  3623.25  4140.33 
2 2002 2002  3057 3057  2038.00  1985.67 
3 2277 2277  3308 3308  2608.00  2324.67 
4 3408 3408  5019 5019  3785.75  3536.00 
5 1871 1871  2895 2895  1817.75  1581.33 
6 2040 2040  2876 2876  2029.75  2122.67 
7 2237 2237  3082 3082  2435.25  2429.00 
8 2947 2947  4156 4156  2852.00  3035.00 
9 2261 2261  3116 3116  2274.75  2220.00 
10 2918 1907  3804 3076  2073.25  1904.00 
Note: Observed values in the cells are per period means over the sessions. 
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A commonly used performance/efficiency index (eg. Cronshaw and Brown-
Kruse (1999), Godby et al. (1997)) rating the performance of observed behaviour 
against the optimal benchmarks is defined as: 
 
)(
)(
BTUCCU
AbatCostCCUI
−
−
=  
where CCU stands for the command and control abatement costs (whereby subjects 
simply use their permits as allocated without engaging in banking nor trading permits) 
under uncertainty; BTU stands for the minimum abatement costs predicted with 
banking, trading, and uncertainty; and, AbatCost stands for the observed abatement 
costs. 
This performance index is therefore a Cost Reduction index in that it measures 
the fraction of the maximum cost savings that could be achievable. Considering the data 
from the grandfathering treatment, the pooled (over the sessions and periods) cost 
reduction index is 90.8% and 93.5% for the BTU System and Market benchmarks, 
respectively. Considering the data from the auctioning treatment, the pooled cost 
reduction index is 93.4% and 95.7% for the BTU System and Market benchmarks, 
respectively. As implied from the discussion above, there are no statistically significant 
differences amongst these percentages, and they are all considerably high. These 
considerations allow us to state the following result: 
 
Result 4: Total abatement cost within our EPM is equal in the grandfathering and 
auctioning treatments. 
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Table 6 – Secondary market benchmarks and observed transaction price and traded volume in the secondary market 
 Secondary Market Benchmarks  Observed Transaction Price and Volume 
 Grandfathering  Auctioning  Grandfathering  Auctioning 
 Price Quantity  Price Quantity  Price Quantity  Price Quantity 
Period System Market System Market  System Market System Market       
1 134 167 8 10   167 0 2  186.14 5.50  193.63 2.67 
2 125 125 8 7    0 0  144.86 5.50  99.86 2.33 
3 145 145 9 8  159 159 2 2  152.18 6.75  156.20 5.00 
4 146 146 10 9  147 147 3 3  161.55 7.25  160.00 3.33 
5 117 117 5 4    0 0  132.00 4.00  97.00 3.33 
6 140 140 9 8  161 161 1 1  150.97 7.75  136.50 2.67 
7 147 147 10 9  151 151 3 3  168.94 8.25  157.85 4.33 
8 147 147 8 8  164 164 2 2  159.47 7.50  155.45 3.67 
9 140 140 9 8  161 161 1 1  150.61 7.75  140.33 3.00 
10 145 104 9 5  146 104 2 1  138.41 6.75  138.88 2.67 
Note: Observed values in the cells are per period means over the sessions. Reported price benchmarks are midpoints of price tunnels encountered in some periods. 
Table 7 – Reconciliation market benchmarks and observed transaction price and traded volume in the reconciliation market 
 Secondary Market Benchmarks  Observed Transaction Price and Volume 
 Grandfathering  Auctioning  Grandfathering  Auctioning 
 Price Quantity  Price Quantity  Price Quantity  Price Quantity 
Period System Market System Market  System Market System Market       
1 140 169 1 1  140 169 1 1  226.67 1.00  136.67 1.00 
2 152 152 3 3  152 152 3 3  198.18 2.82  115.86 2.43 
3 152 152 1 1  152 152 1 1  261.25 1.00  226.50 1.00 
4 149  1   149 149 1 1  138.75 1.00  136.67 1.00 
5 177 177 3 3  177 177 3 3  190.80 2.60  130.00 2.00 
6 149 149 1 1  149 149 1 1  334.50 1.00  280.67 1.00 
7 151 151 1 1  151 151 1 1  343.75 1.00  190.00 1.00 
8 177 177 2 2  177 177 2 2  249.43 1.86  228.50 2.00 
9 149 149 1 1  149 149 1 1  315.00 1.00  200.00 1.00 
10 142 107 1 1  142 107 1 1  142.50 1.00  104.00 1.00 
Note: Observed values in the cells are per period means over the sessions. 
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Figure 8 (and the summary statistics presented in Table 6) reveals that 
transaction prices in the secondary market for the grandfathering treatment are higher 
than those registered for the auctioning treatment. This result does not accord with prior 
expectations conditioned on an efficient performance of the initial auction format 
chosen to allocate permits. Despite these apparent differences, a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test applied to per period means yields a p-value of 0.45, thereby failing to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two sets of independent values are from populations 
with the same distribution. Trading volumes, on the other hand, are statistically 
significantly different between the treatments (p-value=0.0003). In fact, Figure 9 shows 
that traded volumes in the secondary market of the auctioning treatment fall below those 
observed in the grandfathering treatment in each and every trading period, as predicted 
based on an efficient allocation of permits achieved by the considered dynamic auction 
for the initial permit allocation. This evidence is, therefore, mixed concerning the 
statement in our last hypothesis referring to behavior in the secondary market. The 
summary statistics reported in Table 7 reveal that transaction prices in the reconciliation 
market for the grandfathering treatment are higher than those registered for the 
auctioning treatment (a statistically significant difference; p-value=0.0342), and that 
traded volumes do not differ between the treatments (p-value=0.89). Given these 
observations, we state our fifth result as: 
 
Result 5: Traded volumes (transaction prices) are lower, but transaction prices (traded 
volumes) are not different, in the secondary (reconciliation) market of the auctioning 
treatment compared with the grandfathering treatment. 
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Figure 8 – Transaction Prices in the Secondary Market 
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Figure 9 – Traded volumes in the Secondary Market 
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To complement the analysis of pricing behavior, we investigate whether the 
pattern of temporal play differs across the treatments. A common measure of pricing 
behavior (eg. Smith and Williams (1983)) is the root mean square difference between 
equilibrium and contract prices during each trading period, α. If there are nt transactions 
in period t, then αt is defined as: 
∑
=
−=
tn
i
ei
t
t PP
n 1
2)(1α  
where Pe stands for the theoretical equilibrium price and Pi for the observed transaction 
prices in period t. Hence, α provides a measure of contract price convergence to the 
equilibrium prediction, and takes the 0 value when all contracts are made at the 
predicted equilibrium price (note that α is unbounded from above, with higher values 
indicating weaker convergence). 
The analysis of the effect of time on the observed convergence measure is 
accomplished econometrically using the natural logarithm of α for each trading period 
in each session as the dependent variable in a linear regression model. Because we are 
modeling a dynamic adjustment process, we allow for heteroskedasticity across sections 
within the treatments, and also allow for the presence of first-order autocorrelation 
(specific to each session) in our estimation procedure. Explanatory variables include 
treatment effects, time effects, price convergence in the reconciliation market of the 
previous period, and their interactions. Treatment effects are measured using a binary 
variable taking the unit value for the auctioning treatment (Auctioning). Because 
behavior in the later part of the sessions (after some initial learning takes place) may 
better reflect any differences in the adjustment patterns between the treatments, time 
effects are measured using a binary variable taking the unit value for the last six trading 
periods within each session (Period>4). The variable αRMmktt-1 is the root mean 
squared deviation of transacted from equilibrium prices in the previous period of the 
reconciliation market, and purports to control for the influence of the reconciliation 
market outcomes on the subsequent main permit market. 
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Table 8 provides feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates of the 
panel-data linear model for these data.12 The regression results show that both the 
differential intercept for the earlier periods and the differential intercept for the six later 
periods of the auctioning treatment are statistically significant at less than the bilateral 
10% significance level, indicating better overall price convergence in the secondary 
market of the auctioning treatment compared with the grandfathering treatment. 
Following the adjustment procedure suggested by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), we 
compute price convergence to occur at a 60% ([exp(-0.92)-1]×100) faster rate in the 
first four periods of the auctioning treatment compared with the same first four periods 
in the grandfathering treatment. This difference in price convergence between the 
treatments is, ceteribus paribus, smaller in the final six periods, amounting to 34% 
([exp(-0.92+0.59)-1]×100) faster in the auctioning treatment (bilateral p-value based on 
the Wald test for the appropriate composite linear hypothesis is 0.09). 
The results also show that the pattern of price convergence differs between the 
final and the earlier trading periods in the grandfathering treatment. In this case, the 
differential intercept is given by the coefficient of the Period variable, indicating that, 
ceteribus paribus, price convergence occurs at a 34% ([exp(-0.41)-1]×100) faster rate in 
the six final periods of the grandfathering treatment, as one would expect if subjects 
adjusted their pricing behavior after some learning took place in the first rounds of the 
treatment. Interestingly, however, we do not observe the same effect occurring in the 
auctioning treatment. Given the adopted specification, such an effect is, all else the 
same, given by the sum of the coefficients on the Period and AuctPer variables, 
amounting to a statistically insignificant effect of a 20% slower convergence rate in the 
final rounds (bilateral p-value based on the Wald test for the appropriate composite 
linear hypothesis is 0.60, thereby failing to reject the null hypothesis of a null effect). 
Turning to the effects of reconciliation market outcomes on the subsequent main 
permit market, the results indicate that weaker convergence in the former increases 
price convergence in the latter at a marginally significant (both in magnitude, and in 
                                                           
12
 We report the results using convergence measures to Market price benchmarks, but the results are 
robust with respect to the use of the alternative System price benchmarks. The results are also robust to 
the use of the “panel corrected standard errors” (PCSEs) as an alternative to the FGLS estimation 
procedure (see Beck and Katz (1995) for a discussion). 
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statistical significance terms – p-value=0.09) rate in the first four rounds of the 
grandfathering treatment. In the final periods, however, slower price convergence in the 
reconciliation market contributes to weaker price convergence in the subsequent main 
permit market of the grandfathering treatment (as measured by the positive impact of 
the variable PerαRMmktt-1). In the auctioning treatment, however, reconciliation market 
outcomes do not shown any statistically significant effect on the subsequent main 
permit market. 
 
Table 8 – FGLS estimates of the linear model of pricing behavior 
Variable Description Coef. SE p-
value 
95% C.I 
Auctioning Auctioning treatment -0.92 0.29 0.00 -1.50 -0.34 
Period Periods 5 - 10 -0.41 0.13 0.00 -0.66 -0.16 
αRMmktt-1 Price convergence RM -1×10-3 6×10-4 0.09 -2×10-3 2×10-4 
PerαRMmktt-1 Period×αRMmktt-1  3×10-3 8×10-4 0.00 1×10-3 4×10-3 
AuctPer Auctioning×Period 0.59 0.35 0.10 -0.11 1.28 
AuctαRMmktt-1 Auctioning×αRMmktt-1 7×10-3 4×10-3 0.06 -4×10-4 0.01 
AuctPerαRMmktt-1 Auctioning×Period×αRMmktt-1 5×10-3 4×10-3 0.22 -0.01 3×10-3 
_cons Intercept 3.63 0.10 0.00 3.43 3.82 
Notes: Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a χ2 value of 29.93 with 7 df, 
implying a p-value less than 0.001. 
 
Overall, the evidence reported here tends to support the working hypotheses 
formulated in the previous section. The magnitude alone of the results obtained with the 
auctioning treatment suggests, however, a better performance of the market under the 
EU ETS in the presence of a 100% initial dynamic auction of permits than with a 100% 
free allocation. This conclusion might still beg a further question: the remarkable 
performance of the auctioning treatment is due to a remarkable performance of the 
proposed auction format (Ausubel), or was any inefficiency in this auction later on 
corrected for during the course of the secondary market? The performance of auctions is 
commonly assessed by examining whether the auction awarded the auctioned goods to 
those subjects who value them the most. Table 9 shows the predicted allocation of 
permits by subject type, averaged over the 10 auction periods. Also reported in the 
Table are the observed allocations by subject type, averaged over the three auctioning 
sessions and auction periods. The results show that observed behavior did not conform 
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exactly to the predicted outcomes in the Ausubel auction, although the differences are 
not statistically significant based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. 
 
Table 9 – Predicted and observed permit allocation in the Ausubel auction 
 Subject Type 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Total 
System benchmark 4.9 10.8 15.2 4.0 15.0 15.9 16.1 6.1 88.0 
Market benchmark 4.9 10.7 15.4 3.9 15.1 15.8 16.1 6.1 88.0 
Observed 4.5 9.5 16.5 3.5 15.2 15.7 16.7 6.4 88.0 
 
In the present context, though, the previous assessment is not a main concern 
given that CO2 permits are freely traded in secondary markets. We might, therefore, also 
answer this question by examining whether transaction prices and quantities conform to 
theoretical predictions conditioned on a fully efficient allocation of permits during the 
initial Ausubel auction. 
Figure 10 plots the difference between observed traded volumes and transaction 
prices to their respective System and Market benchmarks in the secondary market for 
the auctioning treatment. The horizontal line marks the zero difference. Observed traded 
quantities follow the “cadence” of the optimum benchmarks on a per period basis, but 
are everywhere above them. As the data in the Figure indicates, these differences are 
statistically significant. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test applied to per period means 
yields a p-value below the 1% significance level when observed values are compared 
with the System and the Market predictions, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the sets of independent values are from populations with the same distribution. 
Observed transaction prices display a more erratic pace when compared to the 
theoretical benchmarks. Pooled over the 10 Periods, mean observed prices are below the 
benchmarks. However, these apparent differences are not statistically significant. A 
two-sided Mann-Whitney test applied to per period means yields a p-value of 0.14 when 
observed values are compared with the System predictions, thereby failing to reject the 
null hypothesis that the two sets of independent values are from populations with the 
same distribution. By the same token, the two-sided Mann-Whitney test applied to per 
period means yields a p-value of 0.15 when observed values are compared with the 
Market predictions, once again failing to reject the test’s null hypothesis.  
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These results suggest that some allocation corrections did occur during the 
secondary market to the initial allocation of permits resulting from the Ausubel auction. 
This means that even if a quite efficient auction format is implemented for a 100% 
initial allocation of permits in the EU ETS, a secondary market for trading amongst 
firms is needed. Taken together, these observations also suggest that often voiced 
concerns that auctioning permits in a primary market dries out trading activity in 
secondary markets may not be warranted. In fact, not only we do observe trading 
activity in this market, but also, and more importantly, transaction prices are overall 
below predictions. This indicates that any attempts, if existed at all, to create scarcity in 
secondary markets, and consequently resell some permits at higher prices, are not 
successful under the features of the implemented auction format. 
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Figure 10 – Observed-Predicted values in the secondary market               
                                    (auctioning treatment) 
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9. Conclusion 
This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% 
auction versus a 100% free allocation of CO2 permits under the rules and parameters 
that mimic the EU ETS (imperfect competition, uncertainty in emissions’ control, and 
allowing banking), with environmental targets more restrictive than the current ones but 
foreseeable for the near future. It also incorporates a first attempt to include in the 
analysis measures of the risk preferences of subjects participating in emission permits 
experiments. Another distinctive feature of this study is the implementation of a 
theoretically appropriate auction format for the primary allocation of emission permits. 
A great effort was dedicated to the design of the instructions. We wanted to ease 
as much as possible the cognitive burden of the subjects given the number of 
tasks/decisions involved and the length of the experiment. The instructions for the 
second part of the experiment, on the elicitation of risk preferences, simply follow 
standard instructions used in many experiments implementing a MPL instrument. The 
design of the instructions for the third part of the experiment was remarkably 
challenging, but quite rewarding: by all casual signs subjects’ comprehension of the 
rules was excellent. 
Overall, the evidence reported in this study tends to support general theoretical 
predictions. Just as important, it clearly suggests that a permit market operating under 
the EU ETS has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions, achieving targets considerably 
more restrictive than the current ones at high efficiency levels. In fact, cost reduction 
indexes generated under both the grandfathering rule and under the 100% auction rule 
are remarkably high. Nonetheless, taking only into account the difference in magnitude 
of performance indexes between the two treatments, the option for auctioning clearly is 
the recommended one. In fact, it does at least as well as the grandfathering initial 
allocation, but reveals a clear potential to do better. In addition, the results reveal that 
concerns about undue scarcity, and corresponding high prices, in secondary markets 
generated by a primary auction market are not warranted under the proposed dynamic 
auction format. 
Traded volumes are, however, clearly lower in the secondary market of the 
auctioning treatment compared to the grandfathering treatment. To the extent that 
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existing transaction costs (a feature not included in our design) interact with initial 
permit allocations in determining the cost-effectiveness of emissions reduction (Cason 
and Gangadharan (2003)), a more accurate initial allocation contributes to the success of 
the trading program by reducing the inter-firm trading volume required to achieve 
abatement cost minimization. Thus, the reduced trading volume observed in the 
secondary market of our auctioning treatment compared to that observed in the 
grandfathering treatment adds weight to the arguments formulated in the literature 
favouring auctioning over grandfathering under proper auction formats. 
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Appendix 
                               Uncertainty Matrix 
Subject 
Period 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
Total 
1 0 1 1 -1 0 1 0 0 2 
2 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -2 
3 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -3 
4 1 1 0 1 0 1 -1 1 4 
5 1 -1 -1 1 0 -1 1 -1 -1 
6 -1 -1 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -4 
7 -1 0 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -5 
8 1 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 
9 -1 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 -2 
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1 2 
Total -1 2 -1 3 -3 -1 -3 -6 -10 
 
 
       Predicted Allocation of Permits in the Ausubel Auction 
Subject Type 
Period 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
1 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
2 5 10 16(15) 4 15 15(16) 16 7 
3 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
4 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
5 4 10 17 4 15 15 17 6 
6 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
7 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
8 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
9 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
10 5 10(11) 16(15) 3(4) 16(15) 16 16 6 
         Note: Values in the cells are Market benchmarks (whithin brackets are System benchmarks when  
                     different from the Market). 
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